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process as the higher types of life. Even granting the progressive character of biological and social evolution, this is but a brief phase in the cosmic process, and can hardly serve to prove the eternal process, as a whole, progressive. Indeed, we are assured by the very apostle of evolution that dissolution is its necessary complement. Not until it is shown that necessity is the working out of the plan of a beneficent intelligence, can we be certain that it must involve progress. It should not be forgotten that progress is not merely an orderly process, but an orderly process from the lower to the higher.

F. C. FRENCH.

Saggi sulla teoria della conoscenza. Saggio primo: Sui limiti e l'oggetto della conoscenza a priori. Per COSMO GUASTELLA. Palermo, Remo Sandron, 1898.—pp. 571.

This is the first of a series of three essays that the author promises us on epistemology. It deals with the question of the *a priori* elements in knowledge, attempting to justify their existence, and to point out the limits in their application. The author starts from the point at which Kant had arrived, on the one hand, and from Mill, Spencer, and Bain on the other. The result is to a large extent a compromise between the opposing schools with a few advances upon each. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the judgment and the concept. The result attained is that reasoning deals with concrete objects rather than with concepts, and that with the rejection of the concept there goes hand in hand the abandonment of the analytic judgment that has been dependent upon it. The predicate of a proposition is never derived from the subject—both are but words applied to a common object. From this, the argument progresses to the conclusion that all reasoning is with particulars, and deduction is merely the interpretation of the results obtained by induction. The second chapter attacks the problem of the metaphysical ultimates: substance, space, time, and causation, and reduces all to groups of phenomena and to connections between phenomena. The thing-in-itself is but a psychological fiction to explain the uniformity of the connection of phenomena, causation a term to indicate the constancy in the temporal sequence of phenomena. Upon the basis of this destructive criticism, it is asserted that there are two kinds of judgments, judgments of existence, that affirm the existence of objects in the external world, and judgments of comparison, that affirm the identity or difference between objects. It is this distinction that furnishes the basis for the succeeding arguments of the book, and that gives Signore Guastella's theory whatever originality that it may possess. The third chapter asserts that the distinction between judgments of existence and of comparison runs parallel to the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori*. All judgments of existence are empirical, and derive their validity from frequency of association. They have, therefore, a psychological warrant, but cannot be metaphysically necessary. Judgments of comparison, on the contrary, are purely subjective in their origin, and give

a necessity that is based upon the fundamental laws of mind and independent of any experience. The two succeeding chapters are given to an examination of the theories of Taine, Condillac, Kant, Hegel, and others in the light of the preceding conclusions. The discussion of Kant's theory brings out in more detail some phases of the author's position. In the main, our author reduces Kant's doctrine of the *a priori* to a series of inconsistencies. In the first place, the assertion that experience can never give universally valid truth is questioned. It is affirmed that this proposition can itself only be derived from experience and so is inherently uncertain. The doctrine of the noumenon is also an unwarranted extension of the category of causality beyond any possible experience. Even the conclusion of the *Æsthetic*, that space is a form of the mind, is affirmed to be rendered untenable by the advances of metageometry. All this is taken to prove that no judgment of existence is *a priori*. On the other hand, it is not possible to give up the universal necessity of mathematical truths, and the sixth chapter solves the difficulty by proving that all mathematical propositions are judgments of comparison, and so need not be dependent upon subjective forms for their validity. The comparison may be universally true whether any general truth may be ascribed to the existences compared or not. The next chapter shows the inadequacy of the attempts made by the empiricists to account for mathematical judgments, while the eighth chapter insists that the feeling of necessity is not due to frequency of association, but results from the fundamental nature of our thought. That our feeling of necessity can be justified, is due to the fact that there are no connections between things except as they are given in our consciousness. The necessity of mental laws is therefore mirrored in the connections of things. The final chapter is devoted to proving that the doctrine of the inconceivability of the opposite, as stated by Spencer and Bain, can be applied to the author's purposes.

Signore Guastella's system, then, so far as it has been developed, is an empiricism that lays claim to universality for its conclusions from its very narrowness. It recognizes nothing but phenomena, but since it recognizes only phenomena, its results obtained from experience must be universally valid. The defects of the system are evident at a glance. Many of them would have been remedied if the author had been familiar with the writings of the more modern logicians, and others would have been impossible in the light of a knowledge of recent psychology. The chief imperfections are due to the retention of the old psychological atomism that can find no explanation for mental connections, except in the elements juxtaposed. The distinction between judgments of comparison and of existence rests rather upon repeated assertion than upon proof. Nowhere in the book do we find a specific differentia between the two, and certainly an examination of mind does not reveal comparisons without things compared. The arguments that deny necessity to one kind of judgment, would deny it to the other also. The distinction seems all the more unnecessary in the light of

the fact that even things are merely phenomena, and so as subjective as their connections. The style of the author seems over-prolix. The argument could have been stated in a third of the space, and have been increased in cogency by the condensation. The proof-reading of the volume was deplorably inaccurate. Misprints are to be found on nearly every page.

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The following books also have been received :

The Individual : A Study of Life and Death. By NATHANIEL SOUTHGATE SHALER. New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1900.—pp. xi, 351.

Social Justice : A Critical Essay. By WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY. New York, The Macmillan Company ; London, Macmillan & Co., 1900.—pp. ix, 385.

The Life, Unpublished Letters, and the Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury. Edited by BENJAMIN RAND. London and New York, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Limited, 1900.—pp. xxxi, 535.

A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix of Leading Passages. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. Cambridge, The University Press, 1900.—pp. ix, 311.

The Peace Conference at the Hague, and its Bearings on International Law and Policy. By FREDERICK W. HOLLS. New York, The Macmillan Company ; London, Macmillan & Co., 1900.—pp. xxiv, 572.

The Soul of a Christian : A Study in the Religious Experience. By FRANK GRANGER. London, Methuen & Co., 1900.—pp. xi, 303.

Spencer and Spencerism. By HECTOR MACPHERSON. New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1900.—pp. vii, 241.

The New Psychology. By J. P. GORDY. New York, Hinds & Noble, 1898.—pp. x, 402.

Brain in Relation to Mind. By J. SANDERSON CHRISTISON. Chicago, The Meng Publishing Co., 1900.—pp. 143.

An Essay on Personality as a Philosophical Principle. By WILFRID RICHMOND. London, Edward Arnold, 1900.—pp. xix, 219.

Whence and Whither : An Inquiry into the Nature of the Soul, its Origin and its Destiny. By PAUL CARUS. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1900.—pp. vi, 188.

The Scientific Evidences of Revealed Religion (The Bishop Paddock Lectures for 1900). By CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900.—pp. xiv, 259.

The Lives of the Painters, Sculptors, and Architects. By GIORGIO VASARI. Vol. III. London, J. M. Dent & Co., 1900.—pp. 301.